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INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE
FOCUS ON HOTELS A N D  H O SPITALITY
Are Floating-Rate Mortgages Best For 
Hotels?
Observations from the Recent Cyclical Peak-to-Trough
BY JOHN (JACK) B. CORGEL, PH.D AND SCOTT GIBSON, PH.D
INTRODUCTION
D u r i n g  J a n u a r y  o f  2 0 0 4 , w e  a t t e n d e d  the American 
Lodging Investment Summit (ALIS), a large hotel industry 
investment conference held each year in Los Angeles. We 
sat through several sessions about financing hotel compa­
nies and properties at the conference. During literally 
every one of these sessions, fairly lengthy, and sometimes 
active, discussions erupted about the effective use of fixed- 
rate versus floating-rate debt for financing hotel invest­
ments. Our take away from the experience—floating-rate 
debt makes sense as a general proposition because hotels, 
unlike other commercial real estate, have pro-cyclical 
income streams unbridled by lease frictions that should 
resemble the time-series patterns of interest rates. 
However, we, like the panelists and other participants 
involved in these sessions, had views grounded in consid­
erable ignorance because empirical work has never been 
done to confirm or refute the validity of financing strate­
gies based on mixing fixed-rate and floating-rate mortgage 
debt
As discussed below, one can quickly construct arguments 
that create reasonable doubt about the time-series relation 
between hotel revenues and debt-service obligations based 
on periodic movements of interest rates. Hence, certifying 
this relation is not obvious, but instead, should follow 
from a managed empirical exercise. During the past few 
months, we spent time assembling the necessary data to 
execute this empirical examination and help answer ques­
tions about how closely hotel RevPARs and interest rate
series used in floating rate mortgage contracts behave over 
time.
This article reports on some of the findings from our larg­
er study. Specifically, we carved out the past five years as 
an especially relevant period because hotel revenues rapid­
ly went from their highest peak ever in 1999 and 2000 to a 
very deep trough in 2002 and 2003. These revenue
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Exhibit 1— Hotel RevPARand LIBOR from Recent Peak 
to Trough
Sources: Seniui Travel Research and Federal Reserve
declines imposed sizeable financial distress costs on hotel 
investors and lenders as evidenced by the large increase in 
hotel delinquencies experienced during this part of the 
cycle.
FINANCIAL DISTRESS COSTS
Under the assumption that debt markets are efficient, debt 
is fairly priced regardless of whether it carries a fixed rate 
or floating rate. Thus, in a world without market frictions, 
the fixed-rate versus floating-rate decision has neutral val­
uation implications. In the real world, however, market 
frictions exist. Of particular importance when considering 
the fixed-rate versus floating-rate decision are issues rele­
vant to managing financial distress costs, such as those 
directly related to mortgage delinquency and default
Given the potential for these costs to arise, fixed-rate ver­
sus floating-rate financing decisions take on significant 
valuation implications. To maximize value, the objective is 
to structure interest payments such that financial distress 
costs are minimized. This objective is accomplished by 
aligning interest payments, to the extent possible, with 
operating cash flows produced by financed assets. When 
hotel operating cash flows decline, as they did during 2001 
through 2003 1H, it is desirous to have interest payment 
obligations coinddently decrease, thus mitigating financial 
distress.
SHOULD HOTEL REVENUES TRACK WITH INTEREST
RATES?
Hotel properties represent a special category of commer­
cial real estate because the users of spaces agree to short­
term (possibly daily) tenancy, as compared to long-term 
(possibly twenty-year) leases. The volatility of revenues is 
a defining characteristic of hotels, a feature often dted by 
investors as the primary reason why hotel properties are 
viewed as riskier investments than other types of real 
estate. Yet for hotels and other property types, long-term, 
fixed-rate mortgages with constant debt service payments 
are the common means of financing.
Evaluations of the financial performance of hotel markets 
often begin with presumptions about the dose relation­
ships between macroeconomic fluctuations (Le., the busi­
ness cycle) and the sales of hotel room nights. The pro­
cyclical nature of the hotel business has substantial sup­
port from historical data. It is not shocking therefore to 
posit a connection between interest rates and hotel rev­
enues even though connections between the real and 
financial sectors of the economy are seldom direct. As eco­
nomic downturns and recoveries occur, the pattern of 
interest rate changes and the pattern of hotel purchases 
may not be synchronized because different sets of con­
sumption behaviors affect travel decisions and decisions 
about borrowing and lending. The connection is further 
douded by the fact that the determinants of average daily 
rates and occupancies come from the supply side of the 
market, which is governed by investment considerations,
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as well as the demand side. Thus, the underlying processes 
that drive the interest rate/RevPAR relation consists of a 
complicated set of consumption and investment influ­
ences.
METHOD AND DATA
The empirical analysis we performed involves a detailed 
examination of the time-series relation between short­
term interest rate series commonly used to in hotel-debt 
finance (i.e., LIBOR) and RevPAR time series for all mar­
ket segments and location subdivisions reported by Smith 
Travel Research (STR). In this article, we rely heavily on 
graphical presentations of the time-series and easy-to- 
understand statistical methods. All RevPAR data come 
from STR and, for this article, possess the characteristics 
described below.
1. Monthly observations from the beginning period of the 
STR time series, January 1999 (1999 Ml) through 
February 2004 (2004 M2).
2. Aggregates hotel performance information for the U.S.; 
for each of STR's chain scales—luxury, upper upscale, 
upscale, midscale with food and beverage, midscale with­
out food and beverage, economy, and independent; and 
for each of the STR location segments—urban, suburban, 
airport, highway, and resort.
3. Performance data during every month includes the 
number of properties, room revenue, number of rooms 
available, and number of rooms sold for each profile in 
(1) and (2) above. RevPARs come from dividing room 
revenue by rooms sold, then dividing rooms sold by 
rooms available, and then taking the product of these two 
results.
Due to the seasonal nature of the hotel business, we sea­
sonally adjust RevPARs for this analysis. Also, due to the 
fact that inflation accumulates in ADRs over time, it is 
appropriate for time-series study to convert RevPARs from 
nominal to real terms. For completeness, we report results 
for both nominal and real RevPAR series.
Data on several short-term and long-term interest rate 
series were obtained from the Federal Reserve. Because 
hotel debt contracts normally include payment adjust­
ment provisions based on short-term interest rate move­
ments, only short-term interest rate series are used in this 
study. The analyses are performed with 3-month LIBOR, 
although several interest rate series were tested. All of the
Exhibit 2
This table shows Pearson correlations coeffic ients for 
U.S. RevPAR, market segments RevPARs, and loca­
tion  segments RevPARs w ith  3-m onth LIBOR All 
data are in levels. The RevPAR data are (1) nominal, 
seasonally adjusted and (2) seasonally adjusted and 
in real dollars. The market segments are: Luxury, 
Upper Upscale, Upscale, Midscale w ith  Food and 
Beverage, Midscale w ithout Food and Beverage, 
Economy, and Independent. The location segments 
are: Urban, Suburban, A irport, Highway, and Resort.
Pearson Coefficient
Hotel Segment Real Nominal
RUS .79* .57*
RLUX .73* .60*
RUU .78* .65*
RUP .89* .78*
RMFB .90* .78*
RMID .77* .37**
RECO .92* .84*
RIND .71* .43*
RURB .76* .62*
RSUB .85* .66*
RAIR .90* .80*
RHW .79* .39**
RRES .46** .18
* Significant at .01 
** Sgnificant at .05
Sources: Smith Travel Research and Federal Reserve
LIBOR series commonly found in hotel debt contracts, 1- 
month LIBOR, 3-month LIBOR, and 1-year LIBOR, move 
in close synchronization with one another, and statistically 
are highly correlated.
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Exhibit 3
Sources: Federal Reserve and Real Estate Research Corporation
RESULTS FROM RECENT PEAK TO  TROUGH
Exhibit 1 presents a graphical view of hotel room revenue 
(RevPAR) and LIBOR movements from 1999 Ml through 
2004 M2. Two measures of RevPAR appear in the exhib­
it—nominal, seasonally adjusted and real, seasonally 
adjusted. The co-movements in LIBOR and the RevPAR 
series are remarkably dose until early 2002 when RevPAR 
began to recover from the trough while LIBOR continued 
to decline. From the perspective of financial distress costs, 
investors who selected floating-rate relative to fixed-rate 
contracts benefited significantly since 2001. For those 
investors, debt obligations declined coincidently with rev­
enue declines and lag revenue recovery.
The correlations in Exhibit 2 indicate dose statistical rela­
tions between LIBOR and all but one RevPAR series dur­
ing the recent peak-to-trough in the hotel market cyde. 
The correlations are for data covering the fell from the 
peak in 2001 Ml through 2004 M2. These relations are 
uniformly strong when the accumulating effect of infla­
tion on room rates is removed. The correlation coefficient 
between U.S. RevPAR and LIBOR during the period was a 
remarkable .79 in real terms and .57 nominal terms. In the 
single case of nominal resort RevPARs and LIBOR is the 
correlation coefficient not statistically significant. Resorts 
follow a different business model than other full-service 
hotels—one in which 50 percent of revenues come from 
non-room sales (i.e., RevPAR), such as food and beverage 
sales.
CONCLUSION: W HAT ABOUT VALUES AND LIBOR?
In a world of cash-flow borrowing and lending, the imme­
diate concern of the parties is whether or not property 
cash flow will comfortably cover property debt-service 
obligations. The results presented above indicate that in a 
peak-to-trough business environment hotel borrowers 
minimize financial distress related to delinquency by uti­
lizing generous amounts of floating-rate mortgage debt 
From a mortgage default perspective, the major concern 
of lenders is what happens to the value of the hotel prop­
erty collateral during a rollercoaster ride through the busi­
ness cycle? Theory suggests that values will rise and fall 
along with cash flow. However, values will move in the 
opposite direction from cash flows when the effects of 
interest rate changes on capitalization rates dominate. 
Exhibit 3 shows how hotel capitalization rates and LIBOR 
behaved between early 1999 and late 2003. As the graph 
indicates, capitalization rates and LIBOR movements fol­
lowed three different patterns.
1. From 1999 through the end of 2000, both series 
increased.
2. From 2001 through mid-2002, the capitalization rate 
was rising and LIBOR was falling.
3. From the second half of 2002 until the end of 2003, 
both series declined.
REAL ESTATE ISSUES 36 FALL 2004
INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE
The most distressful period for hotel borrowers and 
lenders occurs when RevPARs experience a sudden and 
dramatic decline, as they did from 2001 through mid- 
2002. During these periods, it would be especially desir­
able if property values were rising due to declining interest 
rates. Rising property values then would serve as a hedge 
against financial distress costs related to delinquency. The 
recent experience, as shown in Exhibit 3, suggests that 
hotel capitalization rates are pro-cyclical except in the case 
when interest rates experience rapid changes. 
Countercyclicality in this instance may be due the sluggish 
nature of capitalization rates relative to short-term rates, 
such as LIBOR. The implication is that property values 
may fall along with RevPARs and LIBOR for some time 
during a cyclical downturn, which further amplifies the 
need for hotel owners to have floating-rate debt in place as 
a buffer to the shock of a peak-to-trough experience. □
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